Recent Developments by Lahey, John H. et al.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH-RESTRICTIONS ON DISSEMI-
NATION OF INFORMATION IN CRIMINAL TRiAL-Hamilton v. Municipal Court for
the Berkeley-Albany Judicial District. 76 Cal. Rptr. 168 (March 20, 1969)-In
November of 1966, a "sit-in" demonstration was held at the University of Califor-
nia-Berkeley to protest the presence on the campus of recruiters for the United
States Armed Forces. The four defendants in the instant case were a part of a
group of ten persons arrested on November 30, 1966, and charged with misde-
meanors.1 The "sit-in" and the subsequent arrests of the demonstrators touched off
a "student strike" at the Berkeley campus, and the controversy was the subject of
intensive local press coverage2 and considerable national attention.3 A pre-trial
hearing was held on December 16, 1966, and Judge Brunn of the Municipal Court
for the Berkeley-Albany Judicial District, fearing that the widespread publicity
would affect the parties' right to a fair trial, issued an order restricting the dis-
semination of information concerning the trial.4 On January 13, 1967, three days
before the trial was to begin, the defendants held a press conference in front of the
Municipal Court Building. In their prepared statement5 the defendants attacked
the pre-trial order on the grounds that it prohibited them from neutralizing the
largely condemnatory publicity that had followed their arrest.6 As a result of
the press release the defendants were charged on the same day with criminal con-
1 CAL. PEN. CODE SEC. 372 (committing a publice nuisance); CAL. PEN. CODE SEC. 602(1)
(unlawful occupation of real property or structures).
2 Berkeley Daily Gazette, editorial: "If the provocateurs must be arrested twice a day and
hauled off to Santa Rita, then that is what should be done. The nonstudent radicals must be
stopped and stopped now. They must not be allowed to continue to mislead and agitate the
campus."
Berkeley Daily Gazette, Chancellor Roger W. Heynes: "Outsiders came on campus with the
intention of breaking campus rules and they did so. In addition, state laws were violated and
arrests were made.... The University must have the authority to protect itself from such
illegal intrusions to insure its operation and integrity."
Oakland Tribune, Governor-Elect Reagan: [defendants are] "middle aged juvenile de-
linquents hanging around the University."
See generally, Defendants Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the Supreme Court of the
United States, at iv, and newspaper clippings filled with the Court.
3 E.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1966, at 29, col. 2. N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1966, at 1, col. 3. N.Y.
Times, Dec. 3, 1966, at 33 col. 3.
4 To assure a fair trial in this case it is essential to keep pre-trial publicity to an absolute
minimum. Therefore, and in accordance with the discussion between the court and counsel in
the presence of the defendants in open court this day.
A- The parties shall not, directly or indirectly, release to any news media information or
opinion concerning the trial or any issue likely to be involved therein, other than the date
and place of trial, the names of the parties and counsel, the contents of the complaint, and
the plea of defendants. Specifically, and without limitation, there shall be no public state-
ments or releases concerning the merits of the complaint, the evidence or arguments to be
adduced by either side, or trial tactics or strategy.
B. This order shall apply inter alia to the parties and their counsel, to all law enforcement
agencies, to the Regents of the University of California and their agents and employees and
to the Associated Students of the University of California, their members and affiliated organi-
zations.
The court recognizes the difficulties inherent in framing any order in this matter and expects
the full cooperation of the parties and their counsel in carrying out the letter and spirit of
this order. The court will entertain motions for any further orders that may be necessary or
desirable in this matter. See 76 Cal. Reptr. at 169-70; Defendants Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari in the Supreme Court, Exhibit C at xiv.
lId., Exhibit D at xv.
6 Supra, note 2.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
tempt for wilful disobedience of the pre-trial order.7 They were convicted on Jan-
uary 16, 1967, of the original misdemeanor charges, and while an appeal from
these charges was pending a writ of prohibition in the Superior Court of Alameda
County was sought to prevent prosecution under the contempt charges. The in-
stant case is an appeal from the denial of the writ of prohibition by the Superior
Court.
The unique posture of this case-that the defendants should attack an order is-
sued for their own protection-does not detract from the constitutional issues
presented. Judge Draper in his dissent from the majority in Hamilton reasoned:
However provocative the words of defendants, they can be punished only
if the order is valid. Disagreement with the words spoken does not war-
rant limiting the freedom to speak them. Unpleasant as it is to me to
deprive defendants of the limited martyrdom for which they seemed so
anxious, I would reverse .... 8
Judge Brunn's order applied inter alia, to "the parties and their counsel, to all
law enforcement agencies, to the Regents of the University of California and their
agents and employees and to the Associated Students .... ." It prohibited these
persons from releasing to the press, either directly or indirectly, information re-
lating to any issue likely to be involved in the trial.9 In upholding the validity of
the pre-trial order the Court of Appeal relies exclusively on Sheppard v. Maxwell.10
Justice Clark, speaking for the majority, directed trial court judges to prohibit the
type of pre-trial publicity that became the ground for reversal in Sheppard:
But we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in
those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception.
The courts must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect
their process from prejudicial outside interferences."
In maintaining that Judge Brunn's order complies with the mandate of Sheppard
the Court of Appeal upheld sweeping restrictions on the speech of great numbers
of persons, including those not parties to the action. That some amount of restric-
tion on first amendment guarantees is necessary to insure the integrity of the
judicial system is clear. The extent of those restrictions is, however, far from dear,
and the instant case illustrates the need for the Supreme Court to give more defini-
tive guidelines to trial judges, who are charged with maintaining the delicate bal-
ance between the often opposing rights of free speech and fair trial.
Drafting a pre-trial order restricting dissemination of information to the
news media is difficult. The trial judge is faced with the Scylla that language too
general will be attacked on the grounds of overbreadth and vagueness, and the
Charybdis that language too specific will be taken as approval to release anything
not specifically proscribed in the text of the order. However difficult the task,
Judge Brunn may arguably have exceeded his authority by issuing an order that
draws too many people within its ambit. In rejecting the contention that the order
was invalid because it applied to the Regents of the University and the Associated
Students, the Hamilton court relies on the much quoted phrase of Justice Clark's
7 CAL PEN. CODB Sec. 166(4).
8 76 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
9 Note that certain facts were specifically exempted from the general restriction, particu-
larly the date and place of the trial, the names of the parties and counsel, the contents of the
complaint, and the plea of the defendants, supra, note 4.
10384 U.S. 333 (1966).
'I d. at 363.
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opinion in Sheppard-"Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, wit-
nesses, court staff, nor enforcement officers coming under the judisdiction of the
court should be permitted to frustrate its function"'1  (emphasis added). Judge
Salsman writing for the majority in the instant case conceded that the University
was not a party to the proceeding, but concluded that since "it [the University] was
the party said to have been directly offended by the conduct of the defendants, and
agents and officers of the University might well have been witnesses at the trial,"' 3
they thus were proper objects of a pre-trial publicity order within the meaning of
Sheppard. Similarly the inclusion of the students was justified on the grounds they
were "potential witnesses."
A pre-trial order much like the order in Hamilton was issued by a judge in the
Twentieth Judicial District Court for the State of Colorado in a case involving the
brutal murder of a coed on the campus of the University of Colorado in August of
1966.14 Here the order extended to local law enforcement officers as well as Uni-
versity officials and employees, but did not go so far as to enjoin the students.
The Medina Committee' 5 cited the order as what it believed to be a dear violation
of first amendment guarantees, and commented further on the potential dangers
fostered by such an order:
That such orders could be used to cover up incompetence, venality, and a
deliberate but covert desire to impede or frustrate criminal procedures
against guilty politicians or those involved in racial disputes and other vio-
lence seems to us to be apparent on the face of the matter.' 6
Undoubtedly Judge Brunn had no such motives when he issued the order, yet to
maintain that such an order "complies with the mandate of Sheppard"'7 creates a
dangerous precedent and underscores the need for the Supreme Court to define the
limits of its directives to trial judges.
An argument parallel to the criticism of the inclusion of students and University
officials in the order can be made against the restrictions imposed on all law en-
forcement agencies. In this respect Judge Brunn's order contradicts the findings of
12Id.
13 76 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
14 THIS MATTER coming before the Court upon the motion of the District Attorney, the
Defendant not appearing in person but by and through his attorney, Rupert M. Ryan, who ex-
pressly waived the presence of the Defendant, and the District Attorney's Office being present
by Rex H. Scott and Joseph C. French, and the Court having considered the motion,
IT IS ORDERED that the People's Motion Be Granted To Prohibit Extra-judicial State-
ments From Officers of Boulder County Sheriff's Office, City of Boulder Police Department,
City of Longmont Police Department, Adams County Sheriff's Office, All Those Witnesses
Listed With the People's Information Heretofore Filed, and University of Colorado Officials
and Employees save and excluding, however, that ... [certain named attorneys be allowed to
speak with all witnesses for purposes of preparing the case].
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that any person within the above described categories is
hereby prohibited from revealing to any person, corporation or partnership including all
news media with the exception as to those people above described any statements concerning any
knowledge as to the facts in the above captioned case. People of the State of Colorado v. Joseph
Dyre Morse, Criminal Action No. 4090, quoted in Final Report: Freedom of the Press and
Fair Trial, 43-44. Judge Harold R. Medina, Chairman [hereafter referred to as the Medina
Committee].
'5 Interim Report: Radio Television and the Administration of Justice: A Documented
Survey of Materials. Medina Committee Report, supra note 13.
36 Id. Final Report: Freedom of the Press and Fair Trial at 44.
17 76 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
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Medina Committee and the Reardon Report,'s both of which were charged with
solving the conflict between fair trial and free press in the criminal context. Specif-
ically, the Reardon Report, although proposing restraints on police officers, is ex-
tremely hesitant to recommend sweeping restrictions in recognition of the argument
that such limitations are unwise if not unconstitutional.' 9 Rather the Committee
carefully designed its proposals so as not to prohibit disclosures of matter which did
not present substantial dangers of potential prejudice.2 In the instant case no at-
tempt was made to limit restrictions to specific matters that might be prejudicial.
Instead, Judge Brunn's order banned dissemination of information concerning "any
issue likely to be involved" in the trial, and the decision in the Court of Appeal
made no indication that any such limitations may have been proper. In defense of
the Hamilton court the issue of whether and to what extent press statements of
police officers may be proscribed by judicial order is only indirectly raised by de-
fendants appeal of their contempt conviction. The Court of Appeal does however
conclude, without qualification, that the pre-trial order does not go further than
the permissible limits of Sheppard. That the instructions in Sheppard may so easily
be used to uphold an order that at best is of questionable constitutional validity
lends support to the argument that a more definitive standard to guide trial judges
is needed.
Criticism of the pervasiveness of Judge Brunn's order may also be extended to
include the applicability of the order to the defendants. Without considering the
extent of the restrictions discussed above, some restraints may justifiably be imposed
upon police and prosecutors while at the same time excluding the defendant from
like restraints. The rationale for such a notion stems from the fact that defendants
in the criminal context are in a much more vulnerable position than government
officials. The latter may defend themselves from allegations of misconduct made by
the defendant in the press after the completion of the trial and their forced silence
will not be construed as an admission of guilt.21 The Hamilton court's suggested
recourse for the defendant is considerably less adequate: "The order does not pro-
hibit the defendants from describing the charges against them and unequivocally as-
serting their own innocence."2' Declaration of innocence no matter how unquali-
fied is to be expected in most cases and without detailed explanation it is relatively
unconvincing to the public. The following are two of many examples where a
declaration of innocence and even subsequent acquittal might not compensate the
defendant for damages to his reputation: (1) in the area of civil rights where the
arrest of the defendants may have resulted from an attempt to exercise constitu-
tionally protected rights, or (2) in the area of religious objections to military ser-
vice where the defendant is motivated by the dictates of his conscience.2 Presum-
ably extrajudicial statements by defendants in defense of their conduct in each of
these situations would violate the pre-trial publicity order in Hamilton and subject
defendants to contempt charges.
Of greater magnitude than the possible damages to a defendants reputation is
'
8 American Bar Association's Advisory Committee's Report on Fair Trial and Free Press,
Paul C. Reardon, Chairman (hereafter referred to as the Reardon Report).
'Old. at 78.
20 Id. at 78; id. at 5.
21 8o NARV. L REv. 185 (1966).
22 76 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
23 See Defendant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in the United States Supreme Court at
19"70]
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the potential danger that pre-trial orders of the type in Hamilton may be used to
minimize public debate. Defendants in the instant case contend that:
If a court can cut off public debate on any "issues" surrounding a case be-
fore it, it can, dearly, cut off public debate on the most important and
vexing questions in the nation and in the community where the trial oc-
curs. 24
In this respect the language of the pre-trial order is again inconsistent with the
proposals of the various committees that have made exhaustive studies of the fair
trial versus free press issue.25 The Reardon Report for example refrained from
recommending any general restrictions on persons who were not either counsel or
law enforcement officers. Their justification for so doing is as follows:
The reason lay in the lack of any widely demonstrated need for such a
general prohibition on private persons-although problems have arisen in
specific cases-as well as in the serious constitutional questions that might
be raised 0
The most the Committee would recommend was to caution the defendant against
making extrajudicial statements, and then only when it is "wholly appropriate" and
only "during the course of an ongoing trial." Admittedly the inquiries of all the
committees have centered around the more sensational crimes such as murder and
rape that may become the objects of widespread publicity.2 8 However, the hesita-
tion of the Reardon Committee to recommend sweeping restrictions on extrajudi-
cial statements takes on greater not less significance when the issues, as in the in-
stant case, are closely related to national controversies, as opposed to the guilt or
innocence of an accused murderer.
Whether or not the actions of the defendants are -to be condoned, one point re-
mains dear. The Hamilton court has relied exclusively on the dictum of Sheppard
v. Maxwell to uphold a pre-trial order drafted in the broadest terms and drawing
within its ambit great numbers of persons including those not parties to the action.
By maintaining unequivocally that such an order "complies with the mandate of
Sheppard"29 the court has created the dangerous possibility that the freedom of
speech of defendants and others may be restricted by the simple expedient of ac-
cusing someone of a crime. When an order of this type is issued in a case involving
controversial political issues there arises the further possibility that the order may
be used as a vehicle for restricting public debate. It is the belief of the authors of
the Reardon Report that there can be an accommodation between the guarantees of
the first and sixth amendments through the adoption of limitations of the release
of information that are carefully defined as to content and timing 39 This conclu-
sion and similar conclusions of a number of authorities followed the adjudication of
Sheppard v. Maxwell and are the product of one of the most searching debates in
recent legal history.a1 The findings of the Reardon Committee are in many respects
24 Id. at 16.
25 See generally, The Reardon Report, The Medina Committee Report, and the Report of
the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System on the "Free Press-Fair Trial" Issue, Irv-
ing R. Kaufman, Chairman, 45 Federal Rules Decisions 391 (1969).26 Reardon Report, supra note 16, at 142.
27Id.
28 Supra note 24.
29 76 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
30 Reardon Report, supra note 16, at 1.
3145 Federal Rules Decision at 397.
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inconsistent with the analysis of the pre-trial order in Hamilton, despite the fact
that both rely extensively, and arguably correctly, on the Sheppard opinion. This
inconsistency, considered in light of the potential dangers involved if the Hamilton
interpretation is followed, emphasizes the need for the Supreme Court to review
the mandate to trial judges handed down in Sheppard. Defendants filed for a writ
of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the United States on August 12, 1969.
Certiorari should be granted.
John H. Labey
DEFAMATION-"PUBLc EVENT" INTERPRETATION OF NEW YORK TImr-s v.
SULLIVAN AS APPLIED TO A CANDIDATE FOR PUBLIC OFFicE-Roy v. Monitor-Pa-
triot Co., 254 A.2d 832 (N. H. Sup. Ct. 1969)-The executrix of the estate of
Alphonse Roy brought a libel action against Monitor-Patriot Co. and North Ameri-
can Newspaper Alliance, Inc.' The complaint alleged that two newspapers2 belong-
ing to Monitor had printed a column libeling Alphonse Roy while he was cam-
paigning for the Democratic nomination for the United States Senate. The column
alleged to contain the libel was Drew Pearson's syndicated column D.C. Merry-Go-
Round which, among other accusations, described Roy as a "former small-time
bootlegger." 3
Since Roy was a candidate for the United States Senate, the law applied in the
case was that the publications about Roy could come under the same constitutional
protections applicable to public officials.4 Accordingly, the trial court instructed
the jury if they found that the bootlegger publication would not be relevant to Roy's
fitness for public office "but was rather a bringing forward of plaintiff's long-for-
gotten misconduct in which the public had no interest, then it would be a private
matter in the private sector," not subject to first amendment protection, and the
jury should consider the claim against both defendants under the law relating to
private libels. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, thereby indicating they
had found the publications to be in the private sector.6 On appeal to the New
Hampshire Supreme Court defendant's main contention was that the publication
could not be found to be purely private defamation exempt from the constitutional
protections of the New York Times rule. This rule has generally been used to per-
mit recovery only on proof that the publication was knowingly false or published
with reckless disregard of the truth.7 The New Hampshire Supreme Court, after
1 Hereinafter referred to as Monitor.
2 The article was printed in two local newspapers, the Concord Daily M onitor and the
New Hampshire Patriot.
3 The article in relevant part reads as follows:
One of [Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate] Hill's primary opponents, Frank L.
Sullivan, was released from the Grasmere County Work Farm just in time to file for
the Senate. With a police record of no fewer than 19 convictions for drunkenness
since 1945, he was serving his latest 90-day sentence.
Carious Call
To make sure he would get out in time to run for the Senate, a former small-
time bootlegger and later U.S. Marshall, Alphonse Roy, telephoned the Grasmere
warden about Sullivan.
4 Roy v. Monitor-Patriot Co., 254 A.2d 832, 833 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1969).
5 Id.
eld.
7 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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disposing of the defendant's other contentions, 8 affirmed the holding of the trial
court.
Both the trial court in its instructions to the jury and the New Hampshire Su-
preme Court in its decision relied on language from Garrison v. Louisiana9 to dis-
tinguish a public from a private libel. The courts, however, have quoted this lan-
guage out of context. The United States Supreme Court in Garrison stated this
principle to support its conclusion that Louisiana's criminal libel statute' 0 was
unconstitutional because if there was a showing of malice in the sense of ill will, the
defense of truth was never available." Garrison was in no way intended to limit
the New York Times rule as the New Hampshire Court is apparently attempting
to do. Conversely, the United States Supreme Court expanded New York Times by
holding that the first amendment protection was also applicable to criticism "which
might touch on an official's fitness for office .. " even if the criticism is also per-
sonally defamatory.' 2
Although the result in Roy cannot be supported by the precedent that the Court
cited, the result finds support in other case law. The New Hampshire Supreme
Court's approach is a logical extension of the "public event" doctrine' 3 espoused by
many commentators in response to the result reached in Time, Inc. v. Hill.14 While
this "doctrine" is merely an effort on the part of some legal writers to harmonize the
various "public" defamation cases, and to develop a somewhat more consistent legal
principle, the cases support, at least indirectly, this idea. It has been presented as a
more equitable way to protect the individual's right to privacy while not infringing
upon the legitimate public right to be informed.
The "public event" interpretation of New York Times yields the following rule:
No publisher of material the subject matter of which is a 'public event'
that is, of legitimate public concern, may be required to respond in dam-
ages because of factual misstatement there, unless such misstatement was
made with knowledge of its falsity, or with reckless disregard of the
truth.15
This distinction would replace both the "public official" and "official conduct" cri-
teria of the orthodox New York Times rule in determining the expanse of the first
amendment's protection in the defamation area.
Several courts have already been using this criteria, at least impliedly, in the area
of New York Times dealing with what has been termed "public figures."'16 This
8 The defendant's also contended that "the Court's charge was so complicated, con-
fused and misleading that the jury probably could not have understood or followed it." The
New Hampshire Supreme Court found that the record would not sustain this contention.
The court also rejected the contention that there was error in the court's charge relating to
private libels. Id. at 834-35.
9 The court in Roy stated that if the publication would not be relevant to Roy's fitness
for public office "but was rather a bringing forward of the plaintiff's long-forgotten mis-
conduct in which the public had no interest, than it would be a private matter in the private
sector;" this quote is taken from Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S 64, 72 (1964).
10 LA. Rzv. STAT. § 14:47-49 (1950).
11379 U.S. at 72.
121d. at 77.
13 See generally Bertelsman, The First Amendment and Protection of Reputation and Pri-
vacy-New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and How it Grew, 56 KY. LJ. 718, 747-51 (1968).
14 385 U.S. 374 (1966).
15 Bertelsman, supra note 13, at 748.
16See Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965); Gilligan v. King, 48 lisc. 2d 212, 264
N.Y.S.2d 309 (1965); Pape v. Time, Inc., 354 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1965) (policemen involved
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classification includes celebrities whose actions, in the court's opinion, are of public
concern,17 but who can hardly be classed as "public officials." The courts have thus
far referred to this class of persons as "public figures,"'I s but in defining who is to
be a "public figure" the courts have always included, if only indirectly, some ele-
ment of public concern. By including this public concern element, the courts are
using the "public event" modification of New York Times. This "public event"
test also simplifies the orthodox New York Times rule by determining which activ-
ity of the included persons is not exempt from first amendment protection. Only
those activities which are the subject of legitimate public interest would be pro-
tected.' 9 Thus, the "public event" test combines the elements of "public officials"
and "public figures" along with the elements of "official conduct" into a single
workable rule to determine if the information is of legitimate public concern.
Rather than straining to force individual situations into the molds of "public of-
ficial" and "official conduct" the courts now can look to the ultimate question that
was used to formulate these molds and directly determine whether the publication
is to be protected.
While the courts in the past have more or less rigidly adhered to the "public
official" doctrine when dealing with candidates for public office, the "public event"
approach can logically be extended to this area, as is shown by the result in Roy.
By using the "public event" approach a jury could decide the relevancy of the pub-
lished comment without resorting to the vague distinctions arising from the "public
official" label. The courts themselves have been far from clear on who can be a
"public official." It has been applied to everyone from a candidate for the office
of President of the United States20 to an officeholder's partner in law practice.2 1
It seems that the courts have some ulterior goal in mind when they determine who
is to be a "public official." This ulterior goal may have been the reason for apply-
in civil rights controversies held subject to New York Times). See also, Thompson v. St
Amant, 250 La. 405, 196 So. 2d 255 (1967) (deputy sheriff); Cf. Tucker v. Kilgore, 388
S.W.2d 112 (Ky. 1964) (policeman involved in minor fracas); Coursey v. Greater Niles
Township Publishing Corp., 82 Ill. App. 2d 76, 227 N.E.2d 164 (1967) (village patrolman);
McNabb v. Tennesseean Newspapers, Inc., 55 Tenn. App. 380, 400 S.W. 2d 871 (1965) (elec-
tion official); News-Journal Co. v. Gallagher, 233 A.2d 166 (Del. 1967) (political committee-
man); Duffy v. Kipers, 26 App. Div. 2d 127, 271 N.Y.S.2d 338 (1966) (deputy town clerk);
Silbowitz v. Lepper, 55 Misc. 2d 433, 285 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1967) (branch post office super-
visor); Zeck v. Spiro, 52 Misc. 2d 629, 276 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1966); Krutech v. Schimmel, 26
App. Div. 2d 1052. 272 N.Y.S.2d 261 (1966) (attorney or auditor retained by local adminis-
tration).
17 See e.g., Cepeda v. Cowles Magazine and Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 840 (1968); see also Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221
N.E.2d 543 (1966).
Is This term was first used in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts (and Associated Press v.
Walker), 388 U.S. 130 (1967). The two cases were decided together to consider the impact of
New York Times on ". . . persons who are not public officials, but who are 'public figures' and
involved in issues in which the public has a justified and important interest." Id. at 134.
19 "It is very well settled that the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and of the
press does not confer upon a newspaper, or anyone else, the privilege of publishing defamation
merely because it has 'news' value, and the public would like to read it." W. PRossER, LAW OF
TORTs 812 (3d ed. 1964). Cf. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86-7, note 13 "A conclusion
that the New York Times malice standards apply could not be reached merely because a state-
ment defamatory of some person in government employ catches the public's interest, that con-
clusion would virtually disregard society's interest in protecting reputation." See Bertelsman,
Libel and Public Men, 52 A.B.A.J. 657, 662 (1966); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the
Lay of Libel: The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CORNELL L. Q. 581, 592-93 (1964).
20 Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 261 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
21 Gilberg v. Goffi, 21 App. Div. 2d 517, 251, N.Y.S.2d 823 (1964).
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ing New York Times to a person not in public life, but who merely is "a participant
in public debate on an issue of grave public concern."' 2
The result reached in Roy is a good example of the benefit of the "public
event" approach to New York Times. If the jury were to apply the sterile classifica-
tion of a "public official" to Alphonse Roy he would no doubt fall into that cate-
gory.2a Then, by again following the rigid confines of New York Times, coupled
with the loose interpretation of "official conduct" in Garrison,24 Roy would be
foreclosed from recovery unless he could show that the falsehood was uttered in
actual malice. The "public event" approach, on the other hand, has allowed the
jury to avoid this rigid and often-times confusing classification, and has allowed it
to look at all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the events to determine
whether they are the subject of legitimate public concern. It is true that even the
"public event" approach will require drawing many fine distinctions (leading to
possible contentions that jury charges are too confusing, as was the case in Roy),
but this seems to be a superior alternative to allowing the private life of public per-
sons to be irrelevantly drawn into the public arena.as The jury in cases such as Roy
can now use the "public event" test to determine the expanse of New York Times
rather than attempting to comprehend the formal labels previously attached to the
public defamation issue.2 6
Mark D. Senff
CONSTITUTIONAL ]LAW-ESTABLISHMENT OF RELIGION-USE OF PUBLIC
PROPERTY FOR RELIGIOUS PURPosES-Lowe v. City of Eugene, - Ore. - , 459
P.2d 222 (1969)-Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. of Eugene, Oregon erected a 51'
concrete tapered cross in November, 1964. The cross was placed on public prop-
erty, located on a butte just north of and conspicuously overlooking the city. An-
other local company donated and installed lighting fixtures in order that the struc-
ture could be clearly illuminated at night during the Christmas and Easter seasons
for the benefit of the people in the town below. A dispute arose, however, over
the use of public property for this purpose. It was further complicated when the
city, though not compensatorily involved, nevertheless granted building and lighting
permits for the structure. These were issued after the cross had been raised without
any official permission to do so. Plaintiff-respondents, citizens of Eugene, repre-
sent a broad spectrum of religious interests.1 They sought a declaratory judgment
that the cross while it stood on the butte was in direct contravention of both the
state and federal constitutions. The latter contention, of primary interest here, was
rooted in the first and the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 2 De-
22 Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964).
23 Numerous cases have held candidates for public office to be "public officials," see e.g.,
Goldwater v. Ginzburg, supra note 20, and Dyer v. Davis, 189 S. 2d 678 (La. Ct. App. 1966).
24 See notes 9 and 12, supra, and accompanying text.
25 For a more extensive and general discussion of the "public event" doctrine see Bertelsman,
supra note 13.
26 Certiorari has been granted in the instant case, and a decision is pending.
1 
"The classification of the Plaintiffs included one Jew and three Humanists who de-
nominated themselves as non-Christians, two Congregationalists, an Episcopalian, and a Bahai,
who denominated themselves as Christian, along with two Unitarians." Brief for Appellant
at 24, Lowe v. City fo Eugene, 451 F.2d 117 (1969).
2 First amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
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fendant-appellants to the action included not only the companies who had partici-
pated in the erection and maintenance of the cross but also the city of Eugene for its
challenged involvement.
The trial court, concentrating on the charter of the city and the statutes of Ore-
gon, held that no specific authority to permit the cross to be placed on public prop-
erty had been conferred upon the city. Beyond this conclusion it felt it was not
required to go. Therefore the constitutional implications were not considered.
Judgment was for the plaintiffs, and a decree to have the cross removed was ren-
dered. On appeal the Oregon Supreme Court initially reversed the trial court. It
felt that the constitutional issues should be decided but that no infringement of
rights had occurred. Subsequently, however, the supreme court granted a petition
for rehearing submitted by the plaintiff-respondents. On October 1, 1969, upon
rehearing the initial majority opinion was withdrawn and the opinion of the dissent
was substituted as the new majority view on the issue 3
Therefore, the cross on public property was held to be inconsistent with the first
amendment, specifically the establishment clause, as applied to state action by the
fourteenth amendment. Justice Goodwin, the author of the accepted majority
view, acknowledged that the cross was a very popular structure with the people of
Eugene and local government was the instrument by which this majority will was
implemented. Yet, in noting that evidence was sufficient to classify this as a reli-
gious activity, he stated, "It was to prevent this very kind of response to majority
pressure... that the establishment clause of the First Amendment was written into
our federal constitution." 4  Furthermore, this is not to be considered a case of de
minimis non carat lex. "The cross does not occupy a large tract of land, but it is
permanent and it is conspicuous . . . .[tjhe city's participation in the display has
placed the city officially and visibly on record in support of those who sought gov-
ernment sponsorship for their religious display." 5
The proper relationship between government and many religious organizations
in the U.S. has been a continuing source of controversy and tension since this coun-
try's inception. The first amendment was intended in part to spare the young
federation of states from the strife which had oppressed Europe for centuries, where
governments had supported one religious belief to the exclusion of the rest.6 While
many people during the period prior to the Constitutional Convention were thinking
in terms of continuing with the institution of an established church for the various
states, wiser minds prevailed.&7 The movement for religious liberty culminated with
the insertion of two clauses into the Bill of Rights: one prohibiting Congress from
passing any act respecting an establishment of religion and one prohibiting Con-
gress from interfering with the free exercise of an individual's religious beliefs.8
Yet guidelines were needed which could effectively delineate this separation be-
tween two spheres of social organization. The need remains today since the con-
flicts, though taking different shapes, still persist to test the nature and extent of
these basic rights of the individual. To the plaintiffs in Lowe this meant that their
gion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....." Fourteenth amendment reads: "No
State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
3 Lowe v. City of Eugene, - Ore. - 459 P.2d 222 (1969).
4 Lowe v. City of Eugene, - Ore. - 451 P.2d 117, 124 (1969).
5Id.
0 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 9 (1947).
7 Id. at 12.
8 See note 2, supram
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local government could not permit the permanent religious structure, inaposite to
their own beliefs, to remain on city property. The line was drawn between church
and state at this point. Where Lowe fits in the context of United States Supreme
Court pronouncements on the subject is to be considered next. For this two factors
are significant: (1) the distinction between the secular and the religious and the
consequences of such a classification; (2) the use of public property for religious
purposes ranging from the permissible to the prohibited.
In attempting to separate that which is secular from that which is religious, the
overiding benchmark principle which lies at the foundation of the distinction is the
Supreme Court's concept of neutrality. Accordingly, the first amendment's estab-
lishment and free exercise clauses are construed to require the government to be
strictly neutral both among various beliefs and between belief and unbelief. This
was certainly the emphasis in School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania
v. Schempp.9 There the Court was faced with possible state action requiring the
application of the fourteenth amendment in the protection of first amendment
rights.10 A Pennsylvania statute provided the conflict with the establishment clause.
The act authorized a practice of daily Bible reading in the public schools without
comment, followed by an in-unison recitation of the Lord's prayer by all students
present. Provision was made for the use of the Catholic Douay version of the
Bible for anyone not desiring to use the King James version. Furthermore, the
practice was not compulsory, in the sense that any student could be excused from
participating if he had a written note from his parents.
Justice Clark, in noting the developments of the Supreme Court's approach to
these problems, reemphasized that as between the separate religions and between
believers and unbelievers, the government must remain neutral.
The wholesome 'neutrality' of which this Court's cases speak thus stems
from a recognition of the teachings of history that powerful sects or
groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and religious func-
tions or a concert or dependency of one upon the other to the end that
official support of the State or Federal Government would be placed be-
hind the tenets of one or of all orthodoxies. This the Establishment
Clause prohibits."1
Yet neutrality in many ways is an elusive concept which requires the task of
further measuring and defining its extent. It is conceivable that being neutral and
taking no action might actually result in unequal treatment. The majority attempted
to guard against this in Schempp by providing guidelines in deciding the case. Here
then the distinction between secular and religious comes into focus. The test as
stated in Schempp is: "what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enact-
ment? ... there must be secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion." 12  By this standard the practices of the relevant
school districts were held to be invalid. The strict neutrality of government had
been violated by the Bible readings and prayer recitations. These were considered
to be essentially religious activities which had the principal effect of furthering the
interests of the churches. The argument that to so exclude the readings is not neu-
9 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
10 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), held that the fourteenth amendment
incorporated and applied against the states the same prohibition found in the first amendment
which is applicable to Congress.





trality but actually partiality toward the "religion of secularism" was specifically re-
jected by the Court.' 3 Justice Clark noted that such would be the case if the gov-
ernment was openly hostile to religion, but that nothing in the opinion prevents ob-
jectively teaching religion as part of the curriculum.14 Schempp is a significant case
in determining the context of the Lowe decision. Both the defendant-appellant and
the plaintiff-respondent felt that the cross on the hilltop had to be justified, if at
all, in terms of the guidelines of Schempp.
The appellant contended that the cross had a primary secular purpose and that
it was not being used as a religious symbol. On the contrary, the cross represented
not only a sign of good will to all but also served as the central fixture for Christ-
mas decorations. The secular effort of the latter is measured in terms of trade
brought to the city during the holiday season due to the attractive display. Further-
more, an attempt was made to minimize any religious connotatons which the struc-
ture might provoke. In this manner it was argued that the cross was not a Latin
religious type but instead was a very modem ornamental war memorial cross with
many pleasing and legitimate aesthetic values as a work of art. On the other hand,
the respondents stress the cross's highly religious symbolic qualities to interject a
primary religious purpose tending toward the advancement of religion. The out-
come of this issue as a matter of fact in the trial court goes far in justifying the
result in Lowe in terms of the Schempp test. There, again, the cross was deter-
mined to be primarily a religious symbol.
It can be observed by the cases decided under the first amendment that in this
area of church-state relations it is necessary to justify practices on the basis of a
secular purpose and effect. Everson v. Board of Education involved the reimburse-
ment to needy parents for their transportation costs incurred by sending their chil-
dren to school on city buses.15 The reimbursements covered not only the costs to
parents of public school children but also parents of parochial school students. In
other words, the practice, grounded in welfare considerations, made no distinction
between a student who attended public school or church school. The Court held
that this did not involve a violation of the first amendment as incorporated by the
fourteenth. It expressly rejected the notion that a state cannot tax one person in
order to reimburse another for payments made in transporting children to parochial
schools.16 Rather the Court concluded that the state law was passed pursuant to a
public need. The purpose of the legislation was to encourage the students of less
fortunate parents to ride in city buses while traveling to and from school. The
alternative would have meant subjecting the student to many of the dangers inherent
in walking or hitchiking to school. The powers of a state to provide for the welfare
of its citizens had a significant impact on the result, notwithstanding that this in-
volved the use of a tax in an incidental support of church school students. It was
the secular rationale and effect of the state legislation which the Court cited as its
basis in finding no violation of the principle of neutrality in governmental relations
with religion.
The same considerations influenced the Supreme Court in McGowan v. Mary-
land.1' There the issue of the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws was ad-
judicated. It was argued that such statutes respected an establishment of religion
in providing the various religious organizations with people to fill their churches.
13 Id. at 225.
1 Id. at 225.
15330 U.S. 1 (1947).
' Old.
17 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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The Court in reviewing the background of such statutes concluded that, while origi-
nally they may have had a religious basis, today strong secular reasons exist for
maintaining one day as a uniform day of rest for everyone. The acts were upheld
due to the presence of primarily secular objectives, even though these reasons pos-
sibly coincide with sectarian objectives as well. By the same token, though Everson
and McGowan could point to discernible secular ends and effects to bridge estab-
lishment tests, the state supreme court in Lowe accepted the finding below that the
cross was primarily religious in nature. Even noting the trend toward secularization
of many previously religious symbols, such as the star or the dove, the state court
held this has not yet eroded the symbolic effect of the cross. The sign of the cross
still denotes the Christian religion, and the purpose of this structure is not signifi-
cantly secular. By the standard of Schempp, therefore, the cross was not constitu-
tionally permissible as long as it was located on the butte.
This brings yet another factor operating in Lowe into focus, one which made the
considerations of secular purpose and effect relevant-the degree of governmental
involvement in the venture. It was argued that public property was being used to
serve religious ends and that consequently, such an involvement by the state is pro-
hibited by the first amendment.' 8 The use to which public property is put has been
a recurring problem facing the Supreme Court in establishment cases. The Schempp
test itself was a product of a series of decisions which had to cope with religious
practices in public schools. McCollum v. Board of Education involved a program
by which religious instruction was provided in the public schools.19 Religious
teachers were brought in each day at the expense of a Council on Religious Educa-
tion composed of members of the Jewish, Catholic and Protestant beliefs. The
school was not required to financially support the program in any manner. How-
ever, it did provide the facilities and did supply the pupils. Those who did not
wish to participate were required to continue regular studies in another part of the
building. The Supreme Court held the program to be in violation of the establish-
ment clause, rejecting the contention that to so hold would be government hostility
toward religion. Again, the use of public facilities was critical. "Here not only
are the State's tax-supported public school buildings used for the dissemination of
religious doctrines. The State also affords an invaluable aid in that it helps to pro-
vide pupils for their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory ma-
chinery." 20
Whether to prohibit the use of public property for religious purposes, however,
is in many respects a consideration of degree. Carried to an extreme, it would very
much indicate a hostility to religion to the extent that freedom to exercise one's re-
ligious belief would be encroached. Such was the pattern in the Supreme Court pro-
nouncements involving the accessibility of public parks for various religious groups.
In Niemotko v. Maryland the appellants were members of the Jehovah's Witnesses re-
ligious sect and had been refused permits to hold religious services in a city park.2 1
The local government, it was found, had no reason for not issuing the permits other
than its general disapproval with the beliefs of the appellants. The Supreme Court
ruled that this was discriminatory action and consequently a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws as relates to appellant 22 The Court did not, however, consider the
18 Appellee's Petition for Rehearing at 7, Lowe v. City of Eugene, - Ore. -, 459 P.2d
222 (1969).
1 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
201d. at 212.




ability of public officials to refuse access of public parks to religious groups alto-
gether. In that case such use was available to any other religious organizations de-
siring to use the park, and therefore, it was not necessary to decide the issue. The
decision serves as a good example, though, of the use of public property by a reli-
gious group which does not in itself violate the first amendment as an establish-
ment of religion. The significance here lies in detecting the outside poles of a
continuum by which the use of public property is measured. On the one hand, to
prevent some religious groups and not others from using city property is prohibited
by the Constitution, which guarantees freedom of belief and expression to all groups
alike.2 Yet on the other hand, to permit public school facilities to be used for reli-
gious indoctrination is an establishment of religion in violation of the first amend-
ment.2
4
The limits along this line might be further clarified by Zorach v. Clauson.
2 5
Here the New York City public schools had a program of religious instruction avail-
able to its students. Seemingly, this could be disposed by McCollum v. Board of
Education,2 6 except for the fact that the instruction was not furnished in the public
buildings themselves. Instead, the practice of "released time" had been instituted
differently, whereby students would leave the school premises to go to religious cen-
ters for the instruction. No public expenditures were made in support of the pro-
gram. It was argued that this should not be treated any differently than McCollum
since the weight and influence of the school is put behind a program for religious
instruction.27 The Court, however, viewed the lack of any public facility connected
with the religious program as being a significant distinction. To hold otherwise
would be an unwarranted extension of McCollum, according to the majority.28
From this it can be seen that the degree of usage of public facilities by religious
organizations can have a relevant effect on whether the Supreme Court views the case
as striking towards an establishment of religion. Where Lowe falls on this consid-
eration of degree denotes its significance as a delineator. Ultimately the weight was
struck in favor of viewing the use of public property here as an establishment of
religion. It was argued and accepted by the dissent, however, that the cross should
be treated in the same manner as the religious services in public parks. "If a city
can validly permit groups to hold religious services in parks, why can it not validly
permit persons to erect a religious symbol, a cross, in a park?"2 9 However, to the
majority of the state court this argument was not convincing. There does seem to
be a distinction between a religious group such as the Jehovah's Witnesses holding
a service in a park, as would a Protestant group hold a sunrise service on Easter,
and the continued presence of a 51' cross on a bluff overlooking an entire city.
With the former, the use of the property is only a temporary inconvenience at best
which will eventually conclude and disperse peacefully. The offense to another in-
dividual is minor when balanced against the right of the religious sect to hold meet-
ings and propagate its views. The cross, though, has a different effect. The offense
to a Jew or a Humanist, such as the plaintiffs in Lowe, is much greater when one
considers the effect of continually viewing an object foreign to their faith that was
placed on city property. The appearance of government acquiescence in its presence
2 3 See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953).
24 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
25 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
20 McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
27 Zorbach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
28 Id.
2 9 Lowe v. City of Eugene, 451 P.2d 117, 123 (1969).
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and approval of one belief over another is heightened when the object is 51' high
and permanent for all to see. This decision, therefore, serves to further delineate
that use of public property by religious groups which is perfectly permissible from
that use which comes in direct conflict with constitutional guarantees.
Finally, though the Supreme Court pronouncements establish the most authorita-
tive guidelines in the area, two state court decisions are important if merely because
of their very similar factual situations. The majority in Lowe before the rehearing
of arguments at least felt these cases were determinative of the result. On closer
observation, however, there are significant differences. State ex Rel. Singelmann v.
Morrison involved a statue placed on property owned by the City of New Orleans. 0
The likeness was of a nun of the Roman Catholic Church, dressed in a habit with
hands posed in a posture of prayer. The Louisiana appellate court refused to have
the statue removed. It was held unobjectionable in an establishment of religion con-
text because the statue was a memorial to a woman who had performed many meri-
torious deeds not only for her church but for the city as well. It is in this regard,
however, that this case and Lowe might be distinguishable. The nun was a public
as well as a religious figure. Should one be prevented from paying tribute to a per-
son who contributed much to society generally simply because that person is also a
church leader? It would seem that the consequence would be a hostility toward
religion and therefore in contradicition to the principle of neutrality expressed in
Schempb. 31  Lowe on the other hand involves an object-a cross which by itself
has no human features, nor has it committed commendable deeds. Rather it acts as
a symbol for something other than its basic physical structure. Consequently,
whether it symbolizes a sectarian or a secular aspect of society becomes more crucial
in a first amendment context, than a statue which transcends both spheres.
Paul v. Dade County involved just such a symbol and the state court even felt
that religion could be its object.3 2 There the local chamber of commerce had placed
a large cross, composed of a string of lights, on the side of the courthouse. The
cross was a temporary one and was removed after the Christmas season. The state
court held that even though the cross could symbolize religion, it nevertheless had a
secular purpose as a major decoration scheme for the holiday season. It, therefore,
was unobjectionable. It is arguable, that following Schempp, if the cross symbolizes
religion and has the effect of advancing it, that this cross too is objectionable.
However, given that Paul is correctly decided, there still remains a basic distinction
between it and Lowe ... the fact that one cross is temporary and the other is per-
manent. Whether this is a distinction which merits a different result is question-
able. Yet the latter is certainly a harder case to pass the "strictures of the Establish-
ment Clause." The continued presence of the permanent structure is a lasting
reminder of an unwarranted tie between government and religion.
To conclude then, the use of public property for religious activities has been a
burning issue whether it has involved religious instruction, religious services, or in
this case, a religious monument. Lowe appraised the constitutional context and held
that a permanent cross remains a symbol of the Christian religion and is not a
proper object to be found on public grounds.
F. Ramsey Coates
3057 So.2d 238 (1952).
31 School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963).
32 202 S.2d 833.
[Vol. 31
CONTRACTS-MiNOR'S MISREPRESENTATION OF MAJoRITY EsToPs THE DE-
FENSE OF INCAPACITY-Haydocy Pontiac, Inc. v. Lee, 19 Ohio App.2d 217, 250
N.E.2d 898 (1969)-On August 22, 1967, Jennifer J. Lee purchased a 1964 Ply-
mouth Fury automobile from Haydocy Pontiac, Inc. The total purchase price of the
automobile including insurance and finance charges was $2,016.36. Miss Lee paid
for the car by trading in an automobile valued at $150.00 and signing a note and
chattel mortgage for the balance. After taking delivery of the car, Miss Lee per-
mitted John L. Roberts to take possession of it. Mr. Roberts subsequently delivered
the automobile to Consolidated Holdings, Inc., which was doing business under the
name of "Motorland Do-It-Yourself." Consolidated Holdings, Inc. went into re-
ceivership with the car still in its possession.
Miss Lee failed to make any payments on the balance owed, and Haydocy Pon-
tiac, Inc. filed suit against her to regain possession of the car or alternatively, to
recover a judgment in the sum of $2,016.36. Miss Lee filed an answer asserting as
an affirmative defense that she was a minor, 20 years old, at the time of the pur-
chase, and that since attaining the age of majority she had ratified neither the agree-
ment, nor the note and chattel mortgage. Miss Lee lost possession of the car to the
repair shop, and neither she nor Haydocy Pontiac, Inc. had been successful in re-
covering it. The facts were undisputed that Miss Lee was a minor when she pur-
chased the car, and that she never ratified the contract upon reaching majority. It
was also undisputed that she falsely represented herself to be 21 years old when she
made the purchase.
The action in the Franklin County Municipal Court resulted in 9. judgment for
the defendant.' The court's decision was based on the fact that Miss Lee was a
minor when she entered into the contract and that she had repudiated it since reach-
ing majority. Haydocy Pontiac, Inc. on appeal claimed that the decision and judg-
ment were contrary to law and against the weight of the evidence. Specifically,
the appellant claimed that Miss Lee could not disaffirm the contract without first
returning the automobile and transferring the certificate of title which had been
made out in her name. On reversing the decision, the court of appeals held that
an infant who disaffirms a contract upon reaching majority, and who cannot restore
the consideration received, must account for its value not exceeding the purchase
price. The rule is applicable only where the minor has induced the contract by
falsely representing his majority, and when the seller is free from bad faith or
fraud.2
The Haydocy decision is the product of a thoughtful reexamination of a minor's
capacity to contract. The decision alters the path by which a minor may be held
accountable for his contractual obligations. The court held that one who fraudu-
lently induces a contract by misrepresenting his majority can be held liable the same
as an adult. The decision departs from the established rule in Ohio by removing
the defense of incapacity to contract, thus enlarging the rights of a defrauded seller.
The decision did not, however, affect the law regarding a minor's contractual obliga-
tions absent misrepresentation or in contracts for necessaries.
The Ohio Supreme Court established the existing law with regard to an infant's
obligation on a fraudulently induced contract in Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co.a Under
this case, a minor who misrepresents his majority may repudiate his contract on
reaching majority and sue to recover all money paid. If, however, he does not re-
turn the consideration received, the seller may counterclaim as damages the fair
I See Haydocy Pontiac, Inc. v. Lee, 19 Ohio App. 2d 217, 250 N.E.2d 898 (1969).
2Id, at 220.
a 119 Ohio St 575, 165 N.E. 93 (1929).
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market value of the property, not to exceed the purchase price. Where the minor
restores the consideration, the seller may counterclaim for deterioration of its value
by use and abuse.4
The holding in Mestetzko is purportedly identical to the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Myers v. Hurley Motor Co.5 A dose examination of the
Myers case, however, indicates the decisions are not identical. In Myers the Court
based its decision on the equity maxim that "seeking equity, he must do equity."6
Although the suit was for money had and received, the Supreme Court said this was
a substitute for an equity action making equity principles applicable. Because of
this the defendant, Hurley Motor Co., could rely on any affirmative defense show-
ing that the plaintiff should not equitably recover, in whole or in part. A success-
ful defense gave the defendant relief only by way of recoupment and did not en-
title him to recover affirmatively against the plaintiff.7
The doctrine of recoupment permits the defendant in a contract action to offer
equitable defenses in mitigation of damages. Its use is limited to a total or partial
failure of the consideration, or for acts of nonfeasance or misfeasance by the plain-
tiff which sprang from the same transaction that created the plaintiff's cause of
action. The purpose of recoupment is only to defeat or abate the plaintiff's dam-
ages and it does not allow an affirmative recovery for the defendant in that action.8
In Mestetzko the Ohio Supreme Court dearly stated that it adopted the Myers
rule as the proper principle of law.9 The court, however, failed to adopt that prin-
ciple into the syllabus, which, in Ohio is the law of the case.10 The syllabus did
not limit the defendant to recoupment only. Rather, the proper measure of damages
is the fair market value not exceeding the purchase price. Because of the syllabus
rule, an Ohio defendant can counterclaim and receive an affirmative judgment
against the plaintiff. In Haydocy the court of appeals also noted this conflict in
Mestetzko, and it too interpreted the syllabus to mean the purchase price and not
the value of the plaintiff's claim to be the proper measure of damages.'1 Thus,
the measure of damages in Myers and Mestetzko are not the same.
Although Haydocy did not alter the existing measure of damages, it did change
the procedure by which a defrauded seller may recover damages. Under Mestetzko,
before the seller could recover damages he was required to wait until the infant
reached majority, repudiated the contract, and sued to regain the full amount paid.12
This meant the seller's right to collect damages depended upon the infant's election to
recover the money he paid. If the infant opted not to recover his money, the seller
could only regain possession of the property. Under the fact pattern in Haydocy,
the seller lost everything, unless he could prove that the infant ratified the contract
after reaching majority. The court in Haydocy concluded there was no compelling
reason to require a seller to wait until the infant sued before he could recover dam-
ages,' 3 and thus, held the seller could properly commence an action against the in-
fant for the purchase price.
4 Id. at 576, 165 N.E. at 93.
5 273 U.S. 18 (1927).
6Id. at 27.
7Id. at 24, 27.
8 Winder v. Caldwell, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 434,443-44 (1852).
) Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., 119 Ohio St. 575, 585, 165 N.E. 93, 96 (1929).
'
0 Merrick v. Ditzler, 91 Ohio St. 256, 264, 110 N.E. 493, 495 (1915).
11 Haydocy Pontiac, Inc. v. Lee, 19 Ohio App. 2d 217, 220, 250 N.E.2d 898, 900 (1969)
12 Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., 119 Ohio St. 575, 576, 165 N.E. 93 (1929).
1- Haydocy Pontiac, Inc., v. Lee, 19 Ohio App. 2d 217, 220, 250 N.E.2d 898, 900 (1969).
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Another change brought about by the Haydocy decision was the determination
that a minor is estopped from pleading his infancy as an affirmative defense, where
he induced the contract by falsely representing that he was of age.14 Because of
the confusing Mestetzko opinion, the question of the applicability of estoppel in
pais has not been previously decided with finality in Ohio. In Myers the United
States Supreme Court explicitly stated the basis for its decision did not rest on an
estoppel theory.15 The Court took this position to conform with its eader decision
in Sims v. Everhardt.16 In Sims the Court said estoppel cannot be invoked against
one who entered into a contract during minority. A fraudulent representation of
capacity is not the equivalent of actual capacity.' 7
The result of the Myers case stemmed from the fact that defendant, Hurley
Motor Co., had an affirmative defense to the suit. Reasoning that the plaintiff
tortiously injured the defendant in the transaction, the Court concluded the defend-
ant could diminish or defeat any recovery against himself, but because this was an
affirmative defense only, the defendant was barred from receiving a judgment in
excess of the plaintiff's claim.' 8 Applying this standard to the rule announced in
the Mestetzko syllabus indicates the Ohio rule rests on a different theory, thus
giving different remedies to defendants similiarly situated.
Because of the conflict between the opinion in Mestetzko and its syllabus, the
Ohio Supreme Court did not explicitly bar estoppel in pais as was done in the Myers
case. By subjecting minors to liability up to the purchase price of their contracts
if they cannot return the consideration, the Ohio rule goes beyond the recoupment
theory of Myers. The counterclaim is not limited to only abating or defeating the
infant's claim; rather, it holds the infant to his contract under an equitable doctrine.
Haydocy does not profess to overrule Mestetzko. It does, however, create new
legal obligations for minors by authorizing the defrauded seller to initiate an action
for damages. All contracts entered into by a minor other than those for necessaries
or those otherwise given legal recognition are still avoidable by him and may be
disaffirmed on reaching majority.19 This means that an infant in Ohio still has the
right to sue under the Mestetzko rule and recover all money paid less any award
from a successful counterclaim.
The significance of Haydocy lies in its determination of how a defrauded seller
may recover damages from one who as a minor induced a contract by falsely stating
he was of age, and also what legal tools are available in such a situation. Because
the decision recognizes estoppel in pais as a legitimate tool, the decision probably
also indirectly benefits emancipated minors. By recognizing estoppel, the court im-
puted adult capacity to a minor in this situation. This can be used to help build a
foundation that will hasten the time when those persons presently labeled emanci-
pated minors will be legally recognized as adults. Judge Strausbaug correctly noted
in Haydocy that:
At a time when we see young persons between 18 and 21 years of age de-
manding and assuming more responsibilities in their daily lives... it seems
timely to re-examine the case law pertaining to contractual rights and re-
sponsibilities of infants to see if the law . . . should be redefined.20
14 Id. at 220-21, 250 N.E.2d at 900.
It Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18,26 (1927).
10 102 U.S. 300 (1880).
171d. at 313.
18 Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18, 27 (1927).
10 Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., 119 Ohio St 575, 581, 165 N.E. 93, 95 (1929).
20 Haydocy Pontiac, Inc. v. Lee, 19 Ohio App. 2d 217, 220, 250 N..2d 898, 900 (1969).
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It is unfortunate that the decision's impact is limited to the situation where a
minor misrepresents his age. It is time for the Ohio courts to reconsider the whole
area of capacity of infants and bestow full contractual rights on emancipated mi-
nors,21 especially in light of the fact that the court in Haydocy had to rely on the
mistake of the syllabus to reach what it considered to be the most socially desirable
result. Today, society no longer feels the need to protect the young adult from
his own inopportune bargains. As a practical matter young people frequently en-
gage in commercial transactions by soliciting an adult co-signer. This is done only
to comply with an outdated legal form and not because there is a felt need to pro-
tect the young person. Minors between the ages of 18 and 21 years old ought to be
accorded a full share of the society in which they live.
Robert C. Barbour
STATE SECURITIES REGULATION-THE NEw OHIO TA-OvER BiD
STATUTE-Section 1707.041-Section 1707.041 of the Ohio Revised Code, which
became effective on October 9, 1969, requires a public announcement and a fair,
full, and effective disclosure to shareholders in regard to take-over bids. The
statute also enumerates certain procedural steps which must be followed if a take-
over bid is to be attempted.' Take-over bids have been called a financial power
play whereby aggressive outside interests move to acquire control of a corporation in
a matter of a short time through the purchase of the necessary shares of its capital
stock pursuant to a public offer.2 The take-over bid, with its element of surprise,
has become a powerful weapon in the acquisition of corporations in the past decade.
Offerors can often gain control of a firm which has previously refused to merge.
Unlike the proxy contests or other conventional forms of acquisition, a tender of-
fers is relatively quick, and involves minimal, nonrecoverable expenses.4
The need for regulation, due to the increasing use of the cash take-over bid,
was recognized first by Congress with passage of the Williams Bill in 1968, which
amends Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to regulate the use of
the cash tender offer by requiring offerors to register with the Securities Exchange
Commission and to disclose certain facts.5 Then when Northwest Industries almost
took over B. F. Goodrich, the Ohio based rubber company, Ohio's machinery for
state regulation was started. While not the first state to do so, Ohio is one of the
leaders in state regulation of take-over bids. Ohio's act is aimed directly at the
surprise element of the bids by requiring effective disclosure of a pending cash or
stock tender offer. The quickness and surprise, so necessary in a successful take-
over bid, are hindered by the various delay provisions of Section 1707.041.
21 See generally, Edge, Voidability of Minor's Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in a Modern
Economy, 1 GA. L. REv. 205 (1966) for an exhaustive study of a minor's contractual rights
and responsibilities along with recommendtions for needed reform.
'OHImo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (Page Supp. 1969).
2 Schmults and Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defensive Tactics, 13 PRACTISING LAW IN-
svrTUTn 155 (1968).
3 The words tender offer and take-over bids are generally used interchangably.
4 See Israels, The Framework, 13 PRACrisiNG LAW INSTITUTE 13, 20 (1968).
5 Stock tender offers were considered a sale within the meaning of section 2(3) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (3) (1964), and
thus required registration pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
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That section applies to any person who makes, or in any way participates or aids
in making, a take-over bid for the securities of a corporation organized under the
laws of Ohio or having its principal place of business and substantial assets within
this state. Either the acquisition or the offer to acquire, if after said acquisition the
offeror would be a record or beneficial owner of more than ten per cent of any class
of the issued and outstanding equity securities of such corporation, is considered a
take-over bid. Exempted from these regulations by definition are: (1) bids made
by a securities dealer for his own account in the ordinary course of business; (2)
good faith offers for the sole account of the offeror and not for purpose of avoid-
ing the provisions of this act, to acquire equity securities and not involving a public
offering within the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; (3) good faith
offers for the sole account of the offeror and not for the purpose of avoiding the
provisions of this act, to acquire equity securities from not more than fifty persons;
and (4) tender offers to which the target company consents.6
A unique and potentially harsh provision included in this act states that any of-
feror who owns five percent or more of the outstanding equity securities, any of
which were purchased within one year before the proposed bid, and who at that
time failed to publicly announce his intention to gain control of the target company,
or otherwise failed to make fair, full, and effective disclosure of such intention to
the persons from whom he acquired such securities, will not be allowed to make the
offer.7 It would appear that an offeror who owns at least five percent of the target
company's stock, and who purchased only a single share within the preceding year
and who at that time failed to announce his intention to take over the company,
would be precluded from making an offer. The problem is that the offeror might
not have had the intention to take over the company when he purchased the stock.
It seems quite inequitable to punish an offeror simply because at the time he pur-
chased the shares he had no intention of taking over the target company.
Take-over bids are prohibited unless at least twenty days prior to the offer, the
offeror publicly announces the terms of the proposed take-over bid and files with
the Division of Securities and the target company copies of certain information re-
quired by the statute. This information must include copies of all prospectuses,
brochures, advertisements or other matters by means of which the offeror proposes
to disclose to the offerees all information material to a decision to accept or reject
the offer; the identity and background of all persons on whose behalf the take-
over bid is made; the source and amount of funds to be used to acquire any equity
security, including statements describing any securities offered in exchange for the
securities of the company; a statement of any plans or proposals the offeror may ef-
fect upon taking control such as a merger, liquidation, or other major changes; com-
plete information on the organization and operations of the offeror; and such other
documents which may be required by the regulations of the Division of Securities
to insure effective disclosure.8
Upon receipt of the filing, the Division of Securities becomes responsible for
determining whether the information filed and the means of transmitting it to the
shareholders of the target company are sufficient to meet the requirements of a fair,
full, and effective disclosure required so that shareholders of the target company
can make an intelligent decision as whether to sell or not.
Within ten days after filing, either the Division of Securities or the target com-
pany may request a hearing to determine if a fair, full, and effective disclosure has
6 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (A) (1). (Page Supp. 1969).
7Id. § 1707.041 (B) (2).
8Id. § 1707.041 (B).
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been made. If no hearing is requested, or if the Division of Securities finds that
no cause for a hearing exists, or if the Division adjudicates, that the offeror pro-
poses to make a fair, full, and effective disclosure, the offer can be made.9
Besides this basic procedure, the act imposes many other conditions. Subsection
(C), which was heavily argued over in the Legislature, is most important. This
provision was intended to protect Ohio shareholders from being excluded from
tender offers because of the provisions of the new statute. The provision states:
... no offeror shall make a take-over bid which is not made to all holders
residing in this state of the equity security that is the subject of such take-
over bid, or which is not made to such holders on the same terms as such
take-over bid is made to holders of such equity security not residing in this
state.' 0
This extra-territorial regulation, based on the state's regulation of commerce power,
may raise some constitutional questions. One answer, given by Arthur I. Vorys be-
fore the Thirteenth Annual Institute on Corporate Legal Problems, was as follows:
Personally, I doubt whether the constitutional issue will be tested. Sec-
tion 1707.19 of the securities law provides for revocation of a dealer's
Ohio license if he violates any of Ohio's securities laws. An out-of-state
dealer, licensed in Ohio, who particiapates in a take-over bid for an Ohio
or Ohio-based corporation will, pursuant to the definition of "Offeror"
mentioned a moment ago, would be required to comply with the new law
or risk losing his Ohio license. This, it seems to me, is the real deterrent
to discrimination against Ohio shareholders by any out-of-state take-over
bidder making a bid for an Ohio or Ohio-based corporation but excepting
from his offer all shares held by Ohio residents."
Another condition of subsection (C) requires that if the terms of a take-over
bid are changed prior to its expiration by increasing the consideration offered, the
offeror must pay the increased consideration for all equity securities taken up
whether they were deposited or taken up before or after the change in the terms
of the take-over bid. A final condition is that if the offer is for less than all the
outstanding equity securities of a class, and if a greater number is deposited within
ten days, the offeror must take up the securities pro rata from all of the shares ten-
dered. A possible explanation for this clause is to avoid having shareholders rush
to accept an offer without first making an intelligent decision, but it may also penal-
ize an aggressive stockholder who wants to sell his shares on an "all or nothing"
basis.
Other subsections list certain areas in which the procedures may vary. If the of-
feror or the target company is a banking corporation, a building and loan associa-
tion, or a public utility, subject to state regulation, the Division of Securities upon
receipt of the filing required by subsection (B) must furnish a copy to the regula-
tory body having jurisdiction over the offeror or the target company.12 If the bank,
building and loan association, or public utility is subject to federal regulation, the
take-over bid is subject to approval by the appropriate federal agency,13 and the
Ohio statute does not apply. If the offeror or the target company is an insurance
9 Id. § 1707.041 (B) (1).
10 Id. § 1707.041 (C).
11 Address by Arthur I. Vorys, Thirteenth Annual Institute on Corporate Legal Problems.
12 Id. § 1707.041 (D).
13 Id. § 1707.041 (H).
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company subject to state regulation, the Superintendent of Insurance is substituted
for the Division of Securities. 14
The stated purpose of the act is to protect shareholders of Ohio corporations.
With the requirements of a fair, full, and effective disclosure, shareholders should
be able to evaluate the adequacy of the offer and should, therefore, be able to make
an intelligent decision. One wonders, however, if the real purpose is not to shield
the management of Ohio corporations from take-over bids. When one considers
the inordinate delay provisions, the restrictions on who can make a bid, the restric-
tions on when a bid can be made, and the powerful control over the bid exercised
by the Division of Securities, valuable time is available for the management to or-
ganize defensive tactics, such as raising the annual dividend rate, communicating to
stockholders, purchasing the corporation's own shares, instituting suits under the anti-
trust laws, providing for staggered terms of the directors, or attempting a defensive
merger in order to defeat a take-over bid.15 The question to be decided is whether
it is desirable to almost completely eliminate the use of the take-over bid in Ohio
in order to gain the statute's desired goals. A strong argument can be made that
take-over bids are beneficial since shareholders often receive more for their shares
than they are presently worth to them. Also, some companies, because of poor
management and ineffective operations, need to be taken over by aggressive manage-
ment. The potential threat of a take-over attempt often keeps management active
and more receptive to the stockholders' desires. Finally, some attempted take-overs
have led to corporate reform of previously unprofitable and vulnerable companies.
Now, however, it appears that the Division of Securities is armed with the
powers, if used effectively, to strike an equilibrium so that Ohio will not become a
haven for management seeking a free hand, while still protecting the interests of
Ohio shareholders. The Division is empowered pursuant to subsection (F) to
prescribe reasonable rules and regulations defining fraudulent, evasive, or grossly
unfair practices in connection with take-over bids.16 By promulgating such rules
the Division of Securities could bring about basic fairness on both sides of this
hotly contested issue. The Legislature has given the Division of Securities a
powerful tool, which, if used wisely will benefit all. We can only wait and see
to determine if that tool is used or misused. If used properly this act will be a
welcome addition to Ohio's security laws.
John W. Hilbert II
14 Id. § 1707.041 (G).
Ir For a discussion of defensive tactics, see Schmults and Kelly, supra note 2.
10 OrHo REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.041 (F). (Page Supp. 1969).
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